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The paper attempts to conciliate the important distinction between 
what-is, or exists, and what-is-not, thereby supporting Russell’s exis-
tential analysis, with some Meinongian insights. For this purpose, it 
surveys the varied inhabitants of the realm of ‘non-being’ and tries to 
clarify their diverse statuses. The position that results makes it possible 
to rescue them back in surprising but non-threatening form, leaving our 
ontology safe from contradiction.
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1. Entering the goddess’s forbidden path
The world of non-existence is surprisingly overpopulated: from fi ctions 
to pure non-existents, quasi-existents, and non-actuals, to thick and 
thin universals, poems and maybe symphonies, maybe numbers, and 
the whole troop of the impossibles. These ‘homeless objects’1 are all 
lodged in realms that we know to be in some sense different from the 
real experiential world, but, somehow, there too. Giving an account 
of how they can be there in their peculiar, non-existent way is a long-
standing puzzle.
To work our way into this ghostly ‘jungle’ it will be helpful to fi rst dis-
tinguish the different sub-species from each other. This can be achieved, 
for example, by considering the diverse ways in which they relate to 
what we can characterise as ‘ordinary existence’ in the actual world. For 
the sake of drawing the line – which we ex-ante assume to be drawable, 
or else we would not make sense of the problem, nor be discussing it at 
all – I will specify what I mean by ‘ordinary existence’. No entity can be 
said to exist in the actual world in an ordinary sense if it is not possible 
1 The expression ‘Heimatlose Gegenstände’ is Meinong’s own. See Meinong 1907.
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to have some kind of experiential acquaintance with it. This need not 
be understood, of course, in literal Russellian terms, but it sets indeed 
a requirement to prove that the experiential conditions of application 
of corresponding statements are satisfi ed in order to make them true.2 
Therefore, no entity can be said to exist in the actual world if a) it is 
not possible to access some spatio-temporal experience that would make 
claims about it true (if it cannot be said to take place at a given point of 
time and in a given situation), b) if we cannot regard judgments about 
it as being actually true on some such basis; c) if it is not possible to re-
identify3 it through different judgements in alternative contexts and d) 
if it can have no causal impact on other such entities. Correspondingly, 
if an entity satisfi es the opposite requirements to a), b), c) and d), we 
would agree that it exists. For exposition purposes, though, I will allow 
talk of ‘non-ordinary’ ways of existence in describing how entities are 
said to be there other than in the sense described. With these clarifi ca-
tions, let us start our surveillance of non-beings.
       a. Fictions (Sherlock Holmes, Pegasus, etc.). These would denote 
individuals who are invented and taken to exist in invented 
worlds. They will never exist in the real actual world, nor will 
their defi ning properties be instantiated in it. Some real expe-
riential individual might exhibit resemblances to Sherlock Hol-
mes, but he would not be him.
       b. Pure non-existents (the alien captured by NASA, Vulcano, Phlo-
giston, etc.). These so denoted guys, unlike Sherlock Holmes or 
Darth Vader (who were never postulated as potential experien-
tial candidates), were described as existent in the actual world, 
but we found proof that they do not. Thus, they actually have 
no existence at all, not even in fi ction,4 nor did they exist and 
2 This requirement, of course, requires some care since non-harmonic concepts 
(among which are the quasi-existences mentioned later) characterise themselves, 
precisely, by an imbalance between their introduction and elimination rules that 
would appear to justify illegitimate existential claims.
3 The identity requirement, pressed emphatically by both Frege (1884) and 
Quine (1969), as well as the spatio-temporal condition, that Quine underwrites too, 
are here necessary though not suffi cient conditions, since numbers, for example, 
would not appear in my account (following criteria a), b) c)) as entities ordinarily 
taken to exist.
4 Note that the difference between Phlogiston and a fi ctional entity is that 
(unlike our notions of Darth Vader or Madame Bovary) our very idea of Phlogiston 
considered it to be a chemical substance that was part of the experiential world. That 
is, it was expected to be experientially detectable (at least at some point and time) 
and thought to have already a causal impact on the world. Once this is proven wrong, 
the kind of entity we meant with Phlogiston ceases to exist. Someone might indeed 
invent a story in which a fi ctional chemical substance with the name ‘Phlogiston’ is 
taken to exist (in the fi ction) but, since it would no longer have the pretence to be 
part of the experiential world, it would not be the same. Such ‘pure non-existents’ 
also differ from ‘Quasi-existents’ in the fact that there is no specifi c identifi able 
experience any more on whose behalf they are considered indirectly proven.
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pass away. A sub-sort of them, however, about whose existence 
or non-existence we have no proof (they might already exist or 
come to existence some time), might be characterised as:
b.1. Potential existents (an engineered rational being result-
ing from the combination of canine and human DNA, a 
super-intelligent human being with telepathic capacities, 
unbelievable sorts of super-powerful robots, etc.) could be 
species of such. Their ambition is to, at some point, have 
ordinary existence, but they do not.
        c. Quasi-existents5 (individual witches, shamans, saints, etc.). 
These are peculiar folks, since while they make it possible to 
identify some real existent beings as their denotation, they mis-
lead us into thinking that what we have identifi ed is a being 
with properties beyond those which the ordinary existent being 
actually has. For example, experiencing a person seemingly in 
trance, claiming to access the spiritual world, acting as a heal-
ing fi gure, using ailments and other non-standard procedures 
in treating others’ illnesses, made it possible to identify a ‘Sha-
man’, but on such experiential basis further extraordinary pow-
ers were attributed to him.6 Quasi-existents, thus, never prop-
erly existed, but there was a specifi c experience on whose behalf 
they were identifi ed. As such an experience it is not merely 
meant some causal effects in the experiential world that made it 
possible to presume their existence, as with some theoretical en-
tities; in this sense they differ from pure, exposed, non-existents 
too. Their relation to ordinary existence can therefore be charac-
terised as misleading. 
       d. Non-actuals (Socrates; Napoleon; Cervantes; Tolong – the dog 
I someday will have already been baptised by my niece). These 
comprise individuals who have been or, predictably, will be, or-
dinary existent beings, but are actually not such. Their relation 
to ordinary existence can be characterised as transient.
        e. Generalia. Here I will include, in an uncritical way, conceptual 
meanings and, more generally, the so-called ‘universals’. The ac-
tual existent world might exemplify them, but they themselves 
would not have ordinary existence as such and never will. If they 
exist, they do so in some other realm.
        f. Subject-dependents (symphonies, poems, tastes, pains, etc.). 
Whether these should be considered in this enumeration is much 
more questionable, but since other authors make a case about 
them, I will include them too. They would exist in ordinary real-
5 With this term, I clearly do not refer to what Meinong (1988: 10–11) characterised 
as ‘quasi-beings’ (Quasisein). I am, actually, not following any given characterisation 
at all, but referring to a distinction previously made in Ramírez (2018: 5)
6 Ramírez (2018, 2012)
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ity as much as our bodily feelings in general do; their existence 
requires our existence, but they are also experientable just the 
same as all other beings that constitute what we consider stand-
ard cases of ordinary existence. They depend upon experiences 
that we conceptually capture, locally7 and in a timely manner. 
This aspect differentiates them from fi ctions and other non-ex-
istents, since the latter are not experienced as such. There is a 
difference between the thinking process and what the process is 
about. We can be said to experience thinking but not to experi-
ence the entity that Sherlock Holmes is supposed to be. Poems, 
though, have a mixed character, in the sense that they partially 
belong to the fi ctional and, to some extent, the generalia groups, 
but full grasp of them requires experiencing their musicality too.
        g. Impossibles (the round square, the simultaneously red and green 
all over book). Clearly, they are not and will never be part of 
ordinary existence; furthermore, ordinary existence absolutely 
abhors them. Among all of the non-existent folks, these are by 
far the most radically threatening ones. This can be for logical or 
empirical reasons. The above are impossible for logical reasons, 
but there is an empirical sub-sort:
g.1. Empirically impossibles (human beings who do not breath, 
stars made out of cotton). These are impossible according 
to what we know about natural laws. Their impossibility 
to take place in ordinary existence depends on how right 
we are in our knowledge about natural world laws. They 
would differ from what I have called ‘potential existents’ in 
that, according to our actual knowledge, the latter do not 
exist, but what we know about the world does not make 
their coming into being completely impossible.
       h. Numbers (0 and the rest). These are as numerous as one wishes, 
up to infi nity, although some of the others could also parallel 
this capacity. Their relation to ordinary existence is the most 
intriguing one. Although they do not exist in the experiential 
world, and never will, they appear to be somehow essential to 
it too. Unlike pure non-existents, they were never postulated as 
real standard existent individuals, and like fi ctions and genera-
lia, their existence, if at all, would be in some other realm.
With this, I think I have a fair taxonomy to start with and to try to 
make sense of their diverse statuses and of their status as a whole.
7 Some have argued that music, for example, is a merely temporal experience, 
but this is disputable since sound waves do seem to be present in some locations.
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2. Meinognian objects or Russellian impostors: 
Do we have to choose?
Russell’s (1905) analysis of non-denoting expressions in terms of defi -
nite descriptions was thought of as a measure to debunk deceiving on-
tological proliferations of the Meinognian type. This also allowed him 
to provide a better solution to the problem of negative existential sen-
tences, with which he had earlier struggled. Russell’s achievement was, 
I believe, a huge step towards clarifying when we should be legitimised 
to assume the existence of what we talk about and when we should not, 
and how we should conduct a corresponding proof. This is a position 
abounded upon by Quine (1953) in his critique of Meinong-like views.
Indeed, we can easily be misled by linguistic appearances, assuming 
the ordinary existence of the presumed referents of our denoting terms. 
With this, I want to make clear where I stand in this regard, in case 
what I have to say in what follows should raise any doubt. To expand 
our ontology, as Meinong (1888) does, to say that with ‘the present King 
of France’ we are referring to an ‘object’ of a peculiar non-being8 sort, 
which is already pre-given and is logically prior to our judgement about 
its existence or non-existence (has ‘external Being’, Außersein: §4) and 
constitutes some more basic ‘grade of Being’, is completely uneconomic 
and confusing. Consider the following quotes
Should I judge of an object that it is not, so it seems that I have to have ap-
prehended it fi rst to say from it that it doesn’t exist (Meinong 1988: 10, §4 
‘On the Externality (Außersein) of the pure object’).
We have to do with a Being, that has neither existence nor subsistence (Bes-
tand), but just to the extent that to both, if one can put it so, as grades of 
Being, existence and subsistence, a third grade is to be added. This Being 
would then belong to each object as such. (Meinong 1988: 10).9
The idea, therefore, is that in considering, for example, ‘the present 
King of France’, we might judge ‘that the present king of France does 
not exist’. The that-clause constitutes what he calls an ‘Objective’, by 
which we are apprehending an object not merely a representation of it 
(Meinong 1988: 9)10 that has Being (in the third grade of our last quote) 
and which we judge as not existing.
8 I will use ‘Being’ and ‘Non-Being’ capitalized when used as substantives, such 
as in ‘has Being or has Non-Being’. Otherwise I will use the non-capitalized ‘being’ 
or ‘non-being’ both as adjectives in “an object of the non-being sort” or to speak of 
individual ‘beings’.
9 These are my own translations from the original German text.
10 That he does not mean merely existence in the representation; see passages 
such as this:
(…) that the object possibly needs the representation ‘not to exist’, just as 
little as to exists, and even that, just to the extent as it should depend from 
‘being represented’ the obtention at most of an existence—existence in the 
representation, that is ‘pseudo-existence’—as a result (Meinong 2018: §4, 9).
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Such an ontology, which embraces all kinds of non-beings, possibles, 
and impossibles (for which this ‘pre-given way of Being as ‘Außersein’ 
holds too), would seem to betray the very sense of the term ontology 
and its allusion to ‘what there is’ as opposed to ‘what is not there’. Mei-
nong’s introduced ‘So-sein-objects’ (to refer to their having ‘a given way 
of being’ even if they do not exist) which he wants to distinguish from 
‘existent objects’ are already more than mere descriptions. They are 
understood as what the description is about and, therefore, as having 
Being. This is, for him, the case with both non-existent objects and pos-
sibilities, and also with fi ctions (such as the golden mountain, which is 
golden and a mountain even if it does not exist). The difference with 
‘real Being’ is something which he wants to make palatable by using 
the contrast between ‘So-sein’ and ‘Sein’ – a distinction that, strictly 
speaking, would work if the former, as the term expresses, is under-
stood as a mere predication, a mere description of a specifi c way of 
being. But it rather amounts to seeing the description (which with Rus-
sell’s procedure would come out as unsaturated) as already concerning 
an object with a peculiar degraded way of being of the ‘non-being sort’. 
He then can be said to split this elementary Being into the existent and 
the non-existent (So-sein) types. Thus, we arrive at a conception that 
to avoid paradox separates the notion of Being from that of Existence, 
as just seen, and splits then Being into two sorts (existent and non-
existent). However, the resource of saying that something is (has some 
objectual pre-given grade of Being) but does not exist strikes one as 
some kind of prestidigitation trick, not far from the claim that ‘what-is-
not is’, which already set all alarms by Parmenides centuries ago. Such 
talk attracted equally harsh critique from Russell, who sharply noticed 
that even the predication of existence had to be allowed in Meinong’s 
picture of the non-existent objects:
but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe 
the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent pres-
ent King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is 
round, and also not round, etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can 
be found to avoid this result, it is to be preferred. (Russell 1905: 483)
By way of such a reconstruction, Russell attempted to show, in Mei-
nong’s own terms, as Bourgeois (1981) argues, the incorrectness of a 
theory that makes it possible to predicate existence of an object that 
does not exist and make further contradictory claims. Meinong’s at-
tempt to distinguish ‘being existent’ (as a mere predication) from ‘exist’ 
in his reply to Russell (Meinong 1907: §3, 1910: §20) was, in Russell’s 
eyes, just an artifi cial manoeuvre that disguised one and the same 
thing (Russell 1907: 439) as two different ones. Notably, even some 
who, like Bourgeois (1981: 665), tried to make sense of Meinong’s re-
sponse, concluded fi nding his proposed solution unable to surmount 
the core of Russell’s objection; the objection allowed being reformulated 
using ‘exists’ itself as a predication and attributing it to an object that 
does not exist. Finally, I do not think the nuclear/extranuclear differen-
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tiation helps any better to make sense of Meinong’s distinction, which 
Parsons (1974: 574) tried to apply to ‘existent golden Mountain’. Nucle-
ar properties are those that according to the description constitute the 
object, ‘being golden’, ‘being existent’, extranuclear ones those that are 
dependent upon external factors such as existence or non-existence. The 
distinction could be said to achieve some clarifi cation of the Meinon-
gian position, maybe, but at the price of acknowledging a predicative 
mode of existence that ends up being devoid of its very sense, making 
its attribution worthless. The alternative proposed by Jacquette (1996: 
81) to consider existence an extranuclear property and, thus, not to al-
low its nuclear use, could work better but, as some have pointed out, 
might require too strong a skimming of the theory for its own liking.
Given such a picture, to conclude that ‘the present King of France’ 
is simply a description of ours, for which there is no reference, and no 
object at all, is a relief. It would unmistakably separate out when what 
we say is asserted about something that is independently there in an 
ordinary experiential way, and just then has Being and Existence, and 
when not.
Nevertheless, this convoluted world of Meinong’s appears to have 
something to it too. This explains why a good array of authors, includ-
ing Chisholm (1973), Parsons (1974), the Routleys (1973), and Jaquette 
(1982, 1996) or Lambert (1974), to name a few, have defended or logi-
cally elaborated consonant views, as well as its recent resurrection 
in the form of more or less watered down contemporary Neo-Meinon-
gian positions, for example, Priest (2005), Berto (2008), Crane (2012), 
Eklund (2005). The diffi culty is how to place some Meinongian insights 
so that it is worth all the efforts of his ‘ontology’ in a helpful way, with-
out making us say what we should not be saying. My purpose, thus, 
is to try to make sense of this comprehensive picture of beings of the 
beyond, in such a way that it allows us to keep the gains of Russell´s 
work. In doing so, I am not going to concentrate directly on Meinong´s 
proposals, but will proceed rather freely in analysing the different mo-
dalities of ‘non-existents’ above independently.
3. From fi ctions to ‘reals’ and back again
I will initiate my journey into the realm of Not-Being by considering 
fi rst ‘the fi ctionals’. I am going to use a little star to distinguish these 
‘beings’* from those belonging to the realm of Being in some ordinary 
experiential sense (those that would correspond in Meinong’s own on-
tology to ‘objects that have real Being’). The * is not meant here to 
suggest that we have to do with a specifi c way of being, of the sort that 
‘is not’, as in Meinong, but in the sense that it is not meant literally. 
Since, as should have become clear, the separation between Being and 
Existence (or ‘there being objects that have no Being’) is, in my view, 
utterly confusing. The peculiarity of such fi ctional, so-called ‘beings’*, 
is that they actually could not be unmasked through a Russellian anal-
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ysis, since they never wore a mask, so to speak. According to Russell´s 
analysis, the term ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in sentences such as (1) ‘Sherlock 
Holmes played the violin’, is to be seen as a defi nite description (record-
ing the main features attributed to Sherlock Holmes in Doyle’s nov-
els). We would then prove that there is no such experiential individual 
that satisfi es it. Without entering the diffi culties that such a descrip-
tive account of proper names is seen to have in the later discussion,11 I 
would say that the real issue here is a different one. Let us reconstruct 
the sentence above in Russellian terms, where SH stands for Sherlock 
Homes and V for ‘plays the violin’.
The second part of the sentence expresses the uniqueness and iden-
tity of the so-described ‘being’*. What is the problem then? In the non-
fi ctional case of ‘the present King of France’, or, for a change, ‘the fi rst 
female President of Russia’, a Russellian reconstruction makes clear 
that there is no experiential individual satisfying the description and 
therefore no such real existent being we are talking about. However, 
it might be that these sentences uttered in some other moment of his-
tory come out true. It is possible that we might, on some occasion, fi nd 
an individual who corresponds to the description. So, here we take the 
sentence ‘the fi rst female President of Russia has a dog’, where the 
FFPR stands for the subject and D for the predicate.
We expect this sentence to be satisfi ed by an existent actual being that 
exhibits those properties if we are to fi nd the sentence true. Comparing 
this now with the sentence (1) above, we see that although it has the 
same form, the peculiarity of (1) is not that it is not satisfi ed by any ex-
istent individual having the characteristics attributed to the assumed 
Sherlock, but, rather, that it could not be. Why? Not because there 
could be many, as Kripke once argued (1980: 58), but because, as the 
second part of the sentence makes clear, there is only one such being, 
and even if we should fi nd another satisfying most of the characteris-
tics of Holmes, it could not be him. It is a characteristic of the authentic 
and unique Sherlock Holmes that he is fi ctional, and an ordinary ex-
istent one would not have such a character. Therefore, while sentence 
(1) does presume the existence of an individual we are talking about, it 
is not open for saturation. It is rather already satisfi ed by our fi ctional 
11 Actually, I am not interested at present in the diffi culties of determining which 
description would be the adequate reconstruction of a proper name, or how it is 
that individuals with differing information manage to refer to the same individual. 
Rather, my focus is on how we prove whether the individual who we are attempting 
to refer to by some, call it, ‘ideal description’ is there or not. Of course, there can be 
differences in the particular aspects being proved by certain individuals depending 
on the information they have. Nevertheless, the way they are proved, in general, by 
human beings, can be the same. This is so even in the limited case where all someone 
might have as a description is that there was someone baptised as ‘Holmes’.
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individual. This means that in speaking about Sherlock Holmes, we do 
not have a normal unsaturated sentence but an already saturated one. 
In contrast, sentence (2) is and should remain unsaturated by any posi-
tive object, as long as no existential individual satisfi es it. However, if 
we reconstruct our sentence (1) in the following way, including F as a 
predicate for fi ctionality,
(1) * 
and then we take ourselves to have a fi ctional being named ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ satisfying the sentence, we fall back into the contradictory 
claim that there is (or exists) a being (without star, since we are talk-
ing about existence without qualifi cation) such that he has the extra 
property of being fi ctitious. Then, since ‘fi ctitious’ means ‘not really ex-
istent’, or so we take it to mean, we obtain our paradox. We actually 
go directly to what Russell found ‘intolerable’ in Meinong’s view of the 
idea of ‘objects that do not have existence’, objects that are graspable, 
and in a way are externally there but do not exist.12 But if we recon-
struct the sentence as in 
(1)** Fic 
using a fi ctional operator to apply it to the existential quantifi er and 
all that follows, then both the description and its saturation by our pre-
sumed existent unique individual come out as fi ctitious. Being fi ctional 
is not here predicated of a pre-given object, but through the operator 
Fic it is meant to characterise existence itself and all that is attributed 
to it (the objects that are part of existence, their properties, and their 
relations). Existence is not a property but a presumption and, there-
fore, merely fi ctional. Furthermore, we should separate out here too 
the existential claim (the existentially quantifi ed sentence) and the ex-
istential presumption that there would really be* a unique object that 
saturates it: the presumption of an individual, call it Fica, that does sat-
isfy (1)**. That is, we need not just say that such and such exists, but 
to represent it to some extent as an existent individual who would, for 
example, occupy a different spatio-temporal point than the other indi-
viduals in a fi ctional play, and picture his continuity and spatial moves 
along the story, his interactions with others, and so on. The proposal, 
therefore, departs from the nuclear/extranuclear distinction or the en-
coding/exemplifying view, since it does not amount to acknowledging a 
merely predicative mode of existence.
12 Such a formulation might suit the case where an existential claim is made that 
describes an apple with such and such properties, and we then saturate the empty 
space with a fake apple as the unique one satisfying the specifi c characteristics of 
the description. Such an ‘apple’ could be seen as really existent though as a fake. It 
might be supposed that regarding a painted picture of Sherlock, put in place of the 
description could do for its existence as well, we could pretend it is the individual 
we are referring to. But since the paper fi gure would not satisfy the descriptions 
attributed to Sherlock Holmes, it would not do either.
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To some extent, the reconstruction presented in (1)** might con-
form more likely with certain forms of pretence accounts (such as Wal-
ton 1990). But, for now, I would not want to commit myself to any label 
until the complete contours and implications of the position I shall be 
defending are in place. The specifi c formulation chosen in (1)**, regard-
less of possible coincidences with other proposals too,13 is thought to 
serve the interests of the view I am leading to and should be read in 
the terms proposed.
Interesting here, from my perspective, is the perfect analogy of the 
structure of fi ctional discourse, whose defi nite descriptions are already 
satisfi ed by a unique individual, with respect to the standard practice 
where ordinary existent individuals are assigned to corresponding ex-
istential sentences. What makes Sherlock Holmes more than a mere 
description is precisely the (fi ctional) presumption of a unique individ-
ual who would exist and who satisfi es the description. Mere possibili-
ties (potential existents), such as ‘the individual who is a combination of 
human and canine DNA’ or ‘the golden pencil on my table’, are not pre-
sumed to have any individual satisfying corresponding descriptions. 
As we put it at the outset, ‘possibilities’ aspire to ordinary existential 
satisfaction; correspondingly, their existential sentences would only be 
fulfi lled if, for example, a real golden pencil is to be found on my desk, 
turning the possibility into a reality and the sentence into a true one. 
If we, therefore, subject them to proof in the Russellian experiential 
sense, we fi nd corresponding descriptions to be empty. It is thus im-
portant not to attribute non-saturated defi nite descriptions positive 
denotation (contrary to what Meinong does with his So-seins in direct 
predications) and to trace a clear distinction between such merely pos-
sible statements and fi ctions. This distances my proposal too, I believe, 
from Meinongian-based free logic accounts (Lambert 1960), since I do 
want to keep differences regarding commitments to existence.
Now, the case of ‘non-actuals’ brings particularly interesting as-
pects to the problem. While it is easier to assimilate future beings to 
mere possibilities and understand them along the same lines, past 
individuals raise interesting questions. It seems to me very weird to 
think of my deceased father as a mere description. I actually consider 
myself as being able to refer back to him, to refer to the individual who 
was there. But how can that be? Kripkean ‘causal chains’ tell a story of 
me referring back to the individual who was baptised ‘XYZ’, and whom 
I call ‘my father’. But the above does not say much about how this is 
possible, nor does it amount to any commitment regarding the acquired 
status of the referred object. Actually, if we look at it, the whole past 
itself does not exist at all! For all that is said, he could perfectly well 
be counted as a Meinognian object with non-existence. If, on the other 
hand, I use Russell’s procedure, a corresponding existential sentence 
would come out false. There is (unfortunately) no such person to be en-
countered anymore. But now what has suddenly struck me as strange 
13 For example, other defenders of the pretence view, such as Recanati (2000).
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is how I have been referring to him all along… as he was there. What 
has really changed? First, there were times when I was away for a long 
period and could not continuously check on him. He could have not 
even been there, and I would have kept referring to him just the same. 
My knowledge of his past existence is no warranty that I am referring 
to an existent being. More worryingly still, the problem expands when 
considering that we have in fact no warranty at all; neither can we be 
said to be referring to an existent being if all we have is the past. The 
whole issue ignites then when thinking that this does not just happen 
with my father, but with all and everything else. How do I keep refer-
ring to it all, if my presumed existent beings are not literally existent 
for me after they pass my surveillance – my experience of them? Testi-
mony can occasionally serve this purpose, but I do not keep reconfi rm-
ing through others the persistence in Being of my objects of reference 
either. What about whole cities and oceans and my very past infancy 
with its populated ingredients, places, and encounters? This is a real 
black hole in our tidy permanent picture of world stability – one we will 
inescapably have to deal with.
On the other hand, while sentences about ‘the golden pencil on my 
desk’ would be satisfi ed by fi nding a unique golden pencil on my desk, 
no future found individual could satisfy the description of my father. 
He is a complete individual (in Meinong’s terms)14 in a way ‘the golden 
pencil on my desk’ is not (despite the unique character of the defi nite 
description). He is also complete in a way Sherlock Holmes isn’t. No 
new individual could, therefore, take his place. In this sense, non-actu-
al past beings clearly differ from mere possibles and fi ctions; of whose 
‘existence’ we merely now as much as the description states. But this 
uniqueness and the once-and-for-all saturated character of descriptions 
of my father by him do not solve the question of non-actuality, which, 
as we just saw, expands also to ordinary existent beings of which we 
just have past experience. Actually, if we consider this problem in its 
threatening radicality, there appears to be no way to give an account 
of the existential stability of our referents, the stability we experience 
them as having for us, by attributing ourselves a capacity to ‘keep them 
present’. To keep, actually, our whole world present beyond the con-
tinuously fl uent and transient character of our experiences. That is, to 
maintain something like an imaginative representation of our world 
while it decays — one where the different real interacting objects are 
attributed, at a representational level, different non-colliding positions 
in space and are expected to have a continuity through time and mobil-
ity consistent with that of our own. If this is how we experience it, we 
must be able to situate these objects and their moves and relations as 
if in some sort of land cart.
14 According to Meinong, while real individuals are complete, fi ctional individuals 
and possible ones are not. We just have as complete a characterization as the 
description goes and that leaves many informational gaps: did Sherlock have an 
ant? Was he ever in Albacete? There can be no true or false answer to that.
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This stable ‘representation’ that carries its complete non-actual ref-
erential objects as something more than mere descriptions15 (and in 
that literal sense I mean the word) would very much resemble the kind 
of representation we reconstructed for the fi ctional case, where it was 
already suggested that making sense of fi ctional claims implies already 
a similar fi guring capacity. This is especially striking in today’s virtual 
games, where we interestingly develop exactly that diagramming in a 
visually 3D representational way through which we put down our own 
way of conceiving it. However, maybe we should rather consider that if 
we can come to such a representational picture in fi ction, it is because 
we already have at our disposal those representational capacities, since 
we need them to constitute what we consider our referential ‘reality’. 
Put differently, that reality, our reality, is fi ction! This means that 
what we would be referring to when speaking of an existent being such 
as that referred to by ‘the ex-President Obama’ in the sentence ‘the 
ex-President Obama is married’ should be reconstructed along similar 
lines to (1) **. With XPO standing for ex-President Obama and M for 
married, we would obtain:
    Fic
where existence is postulated again at a representational level and 
presumed. Presumed too is the existence of a corresponding object sat-
isfying the statement, as ex-President Obama himself is. Of course, I 
cannot literally mean that there is no difference between reality and 
fi ction, and I do not. What I am saying is that referring to reals requires 
such a representation too (in the alluded literal sense of representation, 
beyond the mere putting into words or, counterpart, thoughts), though 
not alone. Therefore, since I am proposing a common reconstruction 
for reals and for fi ctions, I will change the fi ctional modifi er Fic of the 
existential sentence above into a presumption modifi er Press. Corre-
15 I found Recanati’s (2000) proposal to solve this problem by appealing to 
descriptive fi les very interesting, and he is probably right that we store fi les that 
way too. However, I think his proposal is not enough for several reasons. First, such 
fi les need not imply taking for existent and referring all along to the individual the 
fi le is about, the one satisfying the corresponding descriptions. Second, referring 
to such an individual as existent requires us making sense of its position and its 
possible further moves, possible future encounters with ourselves or others in 
other places in a consistent and timely manner. This requires, I believe, activating 
some spatio-temporal representational coordinates. Therefore, this position might 
be complementary to his. Actually, Recanati (2018), in discussing parafi ctional 
discourse, poses precisely the problem I allude to in defence of a ‘presumption’ instead 
of a ‘pretence’ view. The parafi ctional use possibly allows a better appreciation of the 
point. As Recanati stated, in parafi ctional uses, we are not pretending; we are taking 
the claims to be true about a given object, for whose purpose the representational 
object in my picture very well serves. Of course, since we move at the representational 
level, neither objects nor properties are real, but just in representational modus. 
Actually, Recanati (2000) mentioned a proposal that defends the existence of ‘dot 
objects.’ I do not know enough about that position, but maybe it comes closer to what 
I am proposing.
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spondingly, (3) ** turns into . Moreover, (1) 
** turns into . The notion of ‘presumption’, 
unlike, for example, ‘pretence’, implies not the faking of something, but 
the taking of it for granted, which I think is not the same.16 Actually, 
I think that in his talk of the ‘parafi ctional’ Recanati (2000) would be 
acknowledging this difference.17 According to Recanati, in parafi ctional 
uses of language we are not pretending but rather taking for true. This 
is akin to what I mean with ‘presumption’. We presume existence at the 
representational level. We presume that these beings exist throughout 
time, and we keep them represented as doing so, while this would just 
be (most of the time) a mere presumption. This is also the case in fi c-
tion, since our attitude in fi ction is not that of mere supposing, but the 
attitude of something being the case, being true. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to specify that with the term ‘presumption’ I am implying the idea 
of treating the corresponding individuals as real, postulating it to be 
the case, as opposed to merely supposing or entertaining a possibility 
that we do not treat as true. But, if ‘ordinary existence’ is to be seen as 
a presumption in this sense, then how do we tell the difference between 
fi ctions and ordinary existents?
Well, we should ask Russell. As he says, this is a matter of acquain-
tance, of the origin of the representation being based in direct acquain-
tance. Not understood literally in the sense Russell meant the notion of 
acquaintance, as we said, but just the idea that it is a form of experien-
tial encounter that gives us grounds to claim that there is a correlation 
between our stable representation of the individual with something out 
there. We have, therefore, to do with a well-grounded presumption, 
which is what we call ‘real existence’. That is, the difference between 
the fi ctional and the real case is not at the level of the type of represen-
tation but is due to the grounding, or lack of it, of the representation. 
It is the mixed character of the real, perfectly experiential, on the one 
hand, and representational, on the other, that makes the difference. 
  So, if the representation, in (6) below, goes for both fi ction and 
real existence, where our picture is kept stable throughout a lifespan 
(until we are told or experience otherwise), real existence departs from 
a prior time-fugitive originating grounding layer (5).
16 In my account we are not simply linguistically pretending that there is an 
individual such and so, and pretending sentences about it to be true, but we are 
actually literally representing some such individual occupying a given space, having 
a continuity through time, etc. and truly referring to it.
17 See footnote above on Recanati.
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(5) tfugitive
(6) tstable
At the experiential level in (5) at t2, our object is not there for us any-
more, but at the representational level in (6) it remains in representa-
tional form as our referential object. The time-limited real experience 
of ex-President Obama builds the well-grounded claim that our stable 
representation of him is real, as long as we (or someone else, in which 
case knowledge of direct experience is obtained by testimony) have a 
new experience to the contrary. Therefore, if we subject our claim to the 
Russellian proof at the experiential level:
 
It comes out positive as soon as we can provide an acquaintance ex-
perience or well-grounded testimony of such. But the stable further 
existence of our referent, when considering it in the modifi ed form of 
(3)***, allows confi rmation in the presumed modus too. Therefore, a 
claim of existence on the basis of such a stable representation, while it 
is a presumption, is a well-grounded one, since at some points of time 
we did have existential satisfaction in the Russellian sense. To put it 
differently, at the level of experience, where we situate ourselves, the 
very existential aspect of our claim in (3)*** Press  fi nds suffi cient 
confi rmation in (3) ,18 when satisfi ed by an individual a, while the 
satisfi ed existential claim in (1)*** does not have a parallel confi rma-
tion in (1). Therefore, our representation in (1)*** is known to us from 
the very beginning, not to be of the experiential reality. It is just our 
representational attitude that is of the same kind. In a sense, it is as 
18 This mixed character explains why at the experiential level in the moment of 
acquaintance we can directly refer a lá Kripke to ‘Gödel’, for example, while later on 
any explanation of who we mean, at that level, for those who lack direct acquaintance, 
must be in descriptive terms, even if the description reduces to the individual that 
was named Gödel at tn in place p. At the same time, though, we have a sense that 
we can keep on directly referring to him, because at the representational level, in 
keeping a corresponding representative of Gödel, we do.
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if our Press acquires the status of a place holder, that 
is of a higher order ‘quantifi er-variable’ of existence itself, that can be 
saturated or not by the real 
On the other hand, the type of justifi cation for our claim in (3)*** is 
not just based on encounters, although it primarily is, but also a matter 
of knowledge. The knowledge is that unless there is a sudden decease, 
living beings continue to exist as we ourselves do. I am absolutely not 
pretending, though, that we would be doing all this labour of deduction 
consciously. It is more a necessary condition of possibility to be able to 
refer in a non-discontinuous way and also plan action and interactions 
with others towards the future. But in becoming aware of this, we can 
explain that we are well justifi ed in doing so, keeping the representa-
tional stability of existence through the procedures mentioned. In some 
cases, where our experiential confi rmation is really a continuous pre-
sential one, paved through continuous encounters and reconfi rmations 
of existence, the presumption is almost equal to experiential reality, as 
happens with our own self, whose past we keep stable too and whose 
present existence we continuously experience.
In the case of deceased non-actual beings, what we become is proof 
of their ceased existence. What we have is a (well-grounded) presump-
tion of existence whose continuity is truncated up to a given point. 
Therefore, representational reference to the past, since stability makes 
it possible to refer back and forth to an individual, is still of the real 
existent kind, as it alludes to a time when there was still the grounded 
level of proof. But nothing of the sort is possible anymore in a present 
or future form.
Notice that the proposal here is an epistemological one. It does not 
limit itself to say in the case of real existence, that there is an individu-
al out there we take our semantics to refer to, as some authors have ar-
gued (for example, Parsons 1974). The idea is more radical in the sense 
that of necessity, the real existent object is just stable as a such for us 
through a representation. This means that we are not referring to an 
existent individual in the experiential world all along and then we give 
a semantic account of it. But, rather, that our experience merely deliv-
ers a punctual basis and the representation is required for stability.
4. Numbers
As Frege (1884) well saw, counting unities requires separating them 
out through a concept.19 This, I believe, need not mean literally that we 
need ‘linguistic concepts’ to distinguish unities, as in some direct real-
ist positions. 20 It also allows for a more basic pre-conceptual reading 
19 ‘Denn der Begriff, dem die Zahl beigelegt wird, grenzt im Allgemeinen das 
unter ihn Fallende in bestimmter Weise ab. Der Begriff “Buchstabe des Wortes 
Zahl” grenzt das Z gegen das a, dieses gegen das h, u. s. w. ab.’ (Frege 1884: § 54, 42).
20 To this point too Ramírez (2020a: 160, footnote 27)
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according to which there is no counting that is not done from a given 
perspective, by distinguishing some particular aspect on whose behalf 
individuals can be separated out from their surroundings. However, 
for the sake of simplicity, I will be referring to the ‘conceptual’ sorting 
out of unities. Yet, if we are to consciously become aware of what it is 
that we do in this process, we would be representing to ourselves this 
very operation (the conceptual detachment of a unity) in general terms, 
a procedure through which we fi guratively capture our own activity. 
That is, we do not cognitively appraise it, as if it would be some further 
occurrence or experienceable phenomenon in our epistemic world, but 
rather we reconstruct what (we think) must be taking place through 
our own performance. In doing so, two aspects should be distinguished: 
the very conceptual individuation and the real individual that results. 
Now, as I have argued elsewhere (Ramírez 2020a:160, 168), I believe 
that, contrary to what Frege ended up capturing, it is the latter that 
constitutes the proper numerical unity. It is not the formal conceptual 
aspect, something that certainly would be equivalent to a class, but the 
corresponding representation of a real individual or a real object cut off 
from an extended background. To put it differently, it is the very stable 
representation of a (non-further saturable) real individual that consti-
tutes the numerical unity. It is a representation, but a representation 
of a reality. This is precisely, I think, the same kind of individual, of a 
singled-out object, we refer to, in both fi ction and our representation of 
reality – not concepts, not classes, not mere descriptions, but the repre-
sentation of the reality that satisfi es our quantoren, and that is exactly 
the same as the numerical unity. While Frege, I believe, was initially 
orientated towards this, he shied away, since this would have brought 
him beyond the mere formal, analytical account to a representational 
one (more akin to the Kantian representation in Intuition).21 He mis-
calculated in thinking that the concept of the unity itself (or of a class of 
them) could be a substitution instance of further existential sentences, 
with the known disappointing consequences.22
However, what results out of the considerations made, to put it con-
cisely, is that Sherlock Holmes, after all, is just…a number – nothing 
we should wonder about, since he always was a master of disguise. But 
we should not feel too superior either, since, at the end of the day, we 
are a number too! But one of a mixed sort: half ghost, half real. Never-
theless, there are still ‘others’ in our list that might have it worse.
21 I use ‘Intuition’ with a capital I to refer to the Kantian notion, to separate 
it out from the mere idea of ‘intuition’ as a presumed alternative way of acquiring 
knowledge.
22 Ramírez 2020a: 161–168.
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5. Pure non-existents
What are we to say of the family of ‘Vulcano’ and the like? We can-
not presume their existence, since what we are presuming is that they 
have none; not even fi ctional. Giving an account of their predicated 
‘non-existence’ has always been especially problematic. In Meinong’s 
ontology, we are saying of an ‘external object’, Vulcano, that non-exis-
tence is attributable to it. We obtain, therefore, the contradiction that 
there is something, we are denoting some object, that is not. Russell’s 
alternative reconstruction dispelled the puzzle, showing that it was 
simply a non-satisfi ed description. So, we have an existential quanti-
fi ed sentence that proves to be non-saturated at the experiential level; 
just as in the case of Jupiter, we have one that is. A reconstruction of 
such sentences as if they would nevertheless be denoting some (low 
grade Being) objects, while posing no problem in fi ction and by the sta-
ble representation of real existent objects when they are not present, 
is here to be avoided. It would block their capability of being saturated 
at the experiential level, which is the only one that could satisfy the 
kind of existential claim made through a statement postulating the ex-
istence of a corresponding planet. According to our knowledge at such 
a level, the sentence would be empty and, if we consider our proof of 
non-existence to be defi nite, then the very possibility considered would 
be denied. If this is the case, then we should conclude that: it is not pos-
sible that there is the object such and so.
But what happens when we have no proof one way or the other? 
What happens when we merely entertain the possible existence of an 
entity such as ‘the nearest by planet containing other intelligent be-
ings’? These are fi nally the ‘possible beings’ we have alluded to but not 
yet directly treated. As opposed to real existence and fi ction, we are not 
representationally taking for granted their actual reality. That is not 
what we want to presume. We know there are no well-grounded rea-
sons to claim real existence (nor to claim the contrary), and as opposed 
to fi ction, we are not presuming them to be objects at the representa-
tional level either. Nevertheless, here too, we want to have the oppor-
tunity to consider them at the representational level, we actually do, in 
order to be able to talk about and operate with them, to consider future 
interactions with others or further consequences that their existence, 
actions, or reactions could have for us in our world. This is like if we 
would keep a chess game board and consider moves back and forth to 
analyse what their consequences would be. In considering their possi-
ble real existence, we are entertaining not their actual reality but some 
possible alternative or future one. But how are we to do this without 
providing such sentences with a denotation, which, if at all, they ought 
to have (corresponding to the claim made) at the level of experiential 
reality? We cannot merely represent such an object as a presumption 
of existence, well-grounded or not, because that would confound it with 
real existents or fi ctions. Therefore, at the representational level, this 
must be reconstructed differently.
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That is, at the representational level, we pictured the resulting uni-
ties of conceptual individuation (those of saturated existential Russel-
lian sentences) as being what we assume to be stable (well-grounded) 
realities. These are taken to have a corresponding experiential ground-
ed level. Fictions, we said, differ in terms of their lack of this mixed 
character and grounding source. They are mere representations of exis-
tence. But we do just the same as we would if they were there, it is just 
that we are aware of their merely presumed character. This cannot be 
equally reconstructed in the ‘entertaining future or alternative reality’ 
cases, since we are in no way representing actual existence.23 We are, 
in fact, representing lack of existence, lack of object, since possibilities 
defi ne themselves by ‘not being taken to be the case’.24 But how can 
that be? Here we have our puzzle back. This was, I guess, the diffi culty 
with which Meinong was confronted. Although he saw in this sense 
no essential difference between fi ctions and possibilities, the quandary 
was to picture something that-is-not as if it would be. Yet, before, when 
giving an account of what it is that we represent when we depict an 
individual as existent, I argued that, ultimately, we had to do with 
numerical unities. If we say there are three cups on the shelf, we dis-
tinguish each cup through the concept and obtain three unities of the 
sort. What remains outside conceptual individuation has no existence 
‘as cup’, so it is nothing from the perspective of the concept.25 If we 
picture the existent unities of the cups, like in (4) a), below, and if we 
want to entertain possible cups that do not exist, this would amount to 
representing them in the territory of non-existence in (b), but relative 
to the concept of ‘cup’.
23 Unfortunately, I cannot enter to comment on the differences of my account 
here with the modal proposals offered by Berto (2008) and Priest (2005), but I guess 
they will be apparent.
24 We can distinguish epistemological and ontological uses of ‘possibility’. This 
can be due to our knowledge: something possibly exists, but we do not know. Or it can 
be an ontological matter: something does not exist, but it possibly could. The claim 
affects surely the second case. However, since we are the ones who represent reality 
according to our knowledge, at the practical level ignorance of whether something is 
the case amounts to not counting it as real either.
25 I am basing myself in this section in both, Ramírez 2020a and 2020b, here 
specifi cally in 2020a: 169–170).
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   (4)*
    
So, if we entertain the possibility of there being two cups on the shelf, 
for example, that means presuming the non-existence of correspond-
ing objects (to remain consistent with possibilities not being existent).26
However, in the sense that there are no objects of the sort and, thus, 
being consistent with Russell’s claim that such denoting expressions 
are not saturated, what we are doing is representing them like in (4)* 
above, as non-existent objects but as cups. Notice that there is a dif-
ference between saying: (i) ‘there is an object that does not exist’, and 
(ii) ‘an object does not exist’. We are saying (ii) and in this sense we 
talk of non-existent objects or non-existent cups, while Meinong was 
seduced to talk about (i). Now, if, as I stated previously, the general 
representation of numerical unities amounts to the representation of 
the application of a concept to some reality, what are these ghostly uni-
ties of non-existence? Well, I have argued (Ramirez 2020a, 2020b) that 
they are the negative numbers. Negative numbers are absences: minus 
1, minus 2, minus 3 objects, which might be cups or whatever, if what 
we are considering is the non-existence but possibility of three cups on 
the shelf, for example. This mere representing of the lack of cups is in-
teresting from the perspective of searching for their reality. After all, it 
is just through a concept, as Frege stated, that we can distinguish uni-
ties, and it is through the concept of ‘cup’ that we are making ‘wholes 
for cups in the emptiness’ so to speak, that are nevertheless not to be 
counted ‘as cups’ and can be counted as cups not being there, and thus 
negative cups. In this way we can accommodate Meinong’s notion that 
the cups are ‘so-seins’, that is, they have the predicative form of ‘being 
cups’ and, as he argued, ‘you can count what doesn´t exist’ (1988: 5). 
There are two negative numbers of cups on the shelf. If we assume this 
is right and go back to our Vulcano case, what is the difference between 
Vulcano of whose non-existence we have proof and the possibilities just 
considered?
If we pay attention, the difference between both parallels with the 
distinction before between fi ctions and realities. At the representational 
level, they are the same, but at the grounding level, we have a differ-
ence. Correspondingly, in the Vulcano case, we would be representing it 
just the same as by possible negative existents, with the difference that 
26 Compare with Ramirez (2020b: 18–19)
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here we have a well-grounded proof of non-existence, the non-saturated 
Russellian sentence at the experiential level, in addition to proof of its 
non-existence. We can thereby make sense of the ‘negative number’ Vul-
cano, which we can say does not have real existence on the basis of a 
proof according to the Russellian method. The mixed character of the 
representation – half experiential (proof of absence at the experiential 
level), half ghost (negative number) so to speak – applies here too. How-
ever, if the proof is defi nitive, as we stated previously, we can simply 
deny , that is, the negative existential presupposi-
tion as a whole.
I am not going to enter much into the realm of the quasi-reals, 
since actually an explicit Russellian sentence at the experiential level 
would exhibit the purported satisfi er as a hoax. Therefore, the status 
of ‘quasi-real’ would thereby have to be abandoned, and we could turn 
the corresponding individuals into fi ctions, attribute them a non-literal 
sense, or make them disappear. Although understanding how such 
terms come into being and their deceiving force is quite interesting, in 
our context they do not add much new. The case of generalia, however, 
I will leave for a future occasion, since although they would behave as 
reals in being partially well grounded, they pose a particularity of their 
own.
 A different issue is with the impossible, which raises much perplex-
ity. As opposed to pure non-existents, with impossibles it is not that we 
have proof of their non-existence. It is that we need not even try, since 
we know in advance that no proof could be found. One option would be 
to see impossibles as irrational numbers, which do express the impos-
sibility of a numerical distribution in any conclusive numerical terms, 
obtaining a number that, in some sense, is not a countable number at 
the same time. It is a magnitude not capturable by one unity or the 
other, not expressively by any discrete counting, since whenever one 
splits a continuum, one originates a difference between the unities and 
the continuum. This is often irrelevant, but sometimes it is not.
So, if an extension is a continuum between two discrete unities – 
call them ‘ ’ and  (which can also be understood as parts and parts of 
parts of unities) – there is always a difference between the numerical 
division and the ‘not-numerically divided’, and therefore something in 
between the split parts. Since it has no presence as any kind of count-
able unity that can be considered ‘something’ (it is no expressible num-
ber), it does not have existence as either the one or the other; or, alter-
natively, it could be included in either. In a sense, it can be considered 
both ‘a’ and ‘b’, but paradoxically ‘a’ defi nes itself by ‘not being b’, from 
which it has been detached. So, it could not be ‘b’ but, at the same time, 
it is not something ‘other than b’, and so it can also be ‘b’. But, then 
again, ‘b’ defi nes itself by not being ‘a’, and so it cannot be ‘a’. However, 
since it is not ‘something other than a’, it can also be ‘a’. So, we obtain 
this contradictory result that it is ‘a’ and ‘b’, but if it is the one it could 
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not be the other. Just the same as the ‘round square’, we fi gure out 
something in the middle of the opposition between round and square – 
something that actually cannot be, since if it is round it is not square, 
and vice versa. Even at a predicative level, and even as a ‘so-sein’ in 
Meinongnian terms, it is contradictory, since it is so and not so at the 
same time. Is it not precisely this position we are somehow imagining? 
Could that do? I will leave it here, since I am aware this might strike 
one as slightly strange but do please give it thought.
With this, I believe we have ordered our ontological picture without 
doing wrong to the extremely important distinction between the exis-
tent and the non-existent in Russellian experiential terms, while at the 
same time making room for some of the Meinongian insights. Meinong’s 
non-existents (including fi ctions, possibles, pure non-existents, and im-
possibles) do not have room in our ontology, for which experientiality, 
as both Russell and Kant claimed, is the basic requirement. Their pre-
sumed existential quantor is a non-saturated one, as we might put it. 
Unlike Meinong, who explicitly denied we had to do with representa-
tions (1988: §4, p. 9),27 we assigned them a place at the representational 
level, where picturing what is not part of the experiential world and 
distinguishing it from what is, is not absurd; furthermore, we came to 
conclude that even the stability of our actual referential world owes 
much to such a representational level too. Reality, as we understand it, 
would not be the reality it is without it.
6. Final thoughts
The picture that emerges from the deliberations above is one in which 
our representational thinking about objects – real or fi ctive, possible, 
impossible, or non-existent – which both Meinong and Frege (with the 
exception of the impossible in the last case) took to be objective, shares 
the same basic structure as our dealing with mathematical numbers. 
That is, in thinking about some such individual, we would be applying 
a certain formal structure to some units that are made available in 
representational modus as something external, and we are ultimately 
operating with numbers.28 In addition, the other way around, when we 
do mathematics, we are, at the end of the day, thinking about reality 
and its possibilities, or even impossibilities, to better understand it.
Pretending that with our rational reconstruction of such a repre-
sentational level (which we take for granted but do not experience as 
such epistemically) we would have to do with an enhancement of the 
world of experience amounts to the same kind of failure Kant so care-
fully separated away in his Critique of Pure Reason. The confusion is 
between transcendental reconstruction and transcendent knowledge 
27 Text quoted in footnote 10.
28 I would not want to commit to fi ctionalism in mathematics, since this 
representational aspect is not simply pretence, but belongs to the very constitutive 
way of our knowledge of the world.
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beyond the realm of experience. In the fi rst case, we are not acquir-
ing any real knowledge. We are rather reconstructing what has to be 
the case for this cognitive activity, characteristic of our knowledge and 
thinking about the world, to be the way we experience it. Moreover, 
we do this in the cognitive terms we understand, fi guring out the con-
ditions that would make it possible, just as we try to fi gure out the 
likely forces behind some events in the world. Of course, we ourselves 
belong to that experiential world, as does our brain, but we cannot 
properly acquire experiential knowledge about how we think. Think-
ing is an experience, but how it occurs is not,29 just as are experiences 
those of other internal events, such as pains, pressures, or emotions, 
not our capturing of them. We can have second-order thoughts about 
our speaking and thinking or our emotions of which we are aware, as 
some have suggested,30 but there is no experience of how we come to do 
so. This is more a matter of inferring that we must have done it, since 
we are aware of them. The representational structure of our thinking 
about existent and non-existent objects or numbers is something we 
would become aware of in an inferential sense: it must be like that. 
We know we think in such a way, but how we manage to do so is a 
later re-enactment. If we are thereby right, it does take place, but our 
knowledge of it is no direct experience, and we cannot claim to know it 
to be. Therefore, it is not true that there are any such external objects 
or numbers, the weeds ought to be purged in this sense, not merely 
domestically arranged. But it is true that we must represent them as 
being (or as lacking).
Finally, it might be claimed that our own representational forces 
are part of the world, and they indiscriminately are so, just as any 
other forces we exert, but they generate no further realities beyond 
themselves.
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